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Executive Summary
Strikes, Social Accords and Industrial Peace:
The Case of the Philippines
 
Proponent: Bureau of Labor Relations
[Portable Document Format (.pdf)]

This study explores the strike situation in the Philippines during the period 1986-2000, and critically examines the factors perceived to have facilitated the steady decline of strikes during the past 15 years.  Contrary to what appears to be a general perception that the social accords were responsible for the downtrend, the paper finds that the decline can be attributed instead to economic difficulties highlighted by high unemployment and underemployment, which dampened the spirit of trade unionists to initiate industrial action.  While a social accord is arguably necessary, it is not a sufficient instrument to restrain workers from mobilizing and sustaining collective actions to advance their industrial interests.  Indeed, the prevailing economic hardships proved to be inhospitable for these initiatives and that industrial peace overtures aimed at restraining workers’ willingness to use strikes as a leverage would be a futile exercise in a situation which casts doubts on the practicality and utility of collective actions.  On the other hand, it is safe to say that the enforcement of strike laws in the wake of the 1987 general strikes has facilitated, to a large extent, the decline in the number of work stoppages in 1988 and 1989, and probably even beyond.  Likewise, the regionalization of minimum wage-fixing has also helped facilitate the downtrend by eliminating a crucial economic issue around which trade unions at the plant level might mobilize.  These factors have diluted the organizational capacities of organized workers to mobilize and sustain collective actions.  However, the same cannot be said of labor-management cooperation schemes, preventive mediation, voluntary arbitration and tripartism.

The “experimentation” failed to give the desired conclusion because the signatories at the national level were not able to secure compliance of their general memberships with the terms of the instruments.  The principles of “mutuality of restrictions” and “last resort” which underpinned the covenants were not concretized.  The national leaderships equally faltered in promoting the expansion of the coverage of the agreements, in particular among other stakeholders who were not part of the signing.  The covenants therefore were just “paper declarations,” conceived in noble intentions, concretized in rhetorics, but doomed to fail due to conceptual and operational limitations.

It is obvious that the downtrend reflects the increasing vulnerability of the labor movement in particular, and the workers in general, in a globalizing economic order which puts constraints on the capacity of third world governments to provide secure and decent jobs for majority of their people whose education and skills do not correspond with the requirements of the new economy.  The study also confirms earlier observations that the downtrend reflects the declining militancy of organized labor, particularly those with militant orientation.  However, it is also evident that independent unions are now becoming the main initiators of most strikes.

There is no doubt that employment preservation has become the major preoccupation of unions.  Hence, strikes as a weapon are now being looked upon with guarded optimism, if not outright indifference, and their utility and usefulness becoming less and less convincing for most workers.  An increasing number of workers seem to be willing and prepared to sacrifice their right to strike at the altar of job security and preservation.  It can also be said that the accords themselves attest to a fragmented movement, which is another reason why the instruments failed to work.  Indeed, industrial peace entails the existence of a strong and unified labor movement which can ensure the “internal discipline necessary for political exchange to become effective.”

 Finally, social agreements are by no means sufficient to bring about industrial peace.  As shown by other countries which have proven that social pacts can deliver desired outcomes, industrial peace is tied to the resolution of much broader political and socio-economic issues.  Industrial peace instruments can never work if they fail to address conditions which continue to breed workers’ dissatisfactions and discontents.  The overarching goal should not be industrial harmony and lower strike activity, but social equity and social justice.  Industrial harmony and stability will remain an elusive goal for as long as workers feel that they do not receive their rightful share of the fruits of production.  It is only through social equity and social justice can we ever hope to achieve a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace.


This paper was presented during the 2nd Quarter Roundatable Discussion Series on Selected DOLE Researches at OSEC Conference Room, 2/F DOLE Executive Building, Intramuros, Manila on 19 June 2003 by Mr. Alex V. Avila of the Bureau of Labor Relations. 

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